Kalyanaram v. UT Dallas (Tex.App.- Dallas, Aug. 7, 2007, pet denied) (sovereign immunity to tort claims, claim for breach of settlement agreement revived) Under the doctrine of official immunity, state employees are immune from being personally liable in tort actions for discretionary acts performed in good faith within the scope of their employment. Koerselman v. Rhynard, 875 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
Official immunity differs from sovereign immunity
Sovereign immunity and official immunity are not synonymous. Sovereing immunity is jurisdictional and insulates governmental entities from suit. Official immunity is an affirmative defense that protects individual officials from liability. DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1995).
Official immunity inures to all governmental employees who perform discretionary functions in good faith and within their authority. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994). Ordinarily, to obtain summary judgment on the basis of official immunity, the movant must conclusively establish that the employee in question was: (1) performing discretionary duties; (2) that were within the scope of the employee’s authority; and (3) the employee acted in good faith. Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 461 (Tex. 2002).
Official immunity doctrine in Texas coextensive with qualified immunity under federal law
“Texas law of official immunity is substantially the same as federal qualified immunity law.” Wren v. Towe, 130 F.3d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1997).
Qualified immunity (leading U.S. Supreme Court precedent)
Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified immunity and are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
Qualified immunity (5th Circuit)
Government officials acting within their discretionary authority are immune from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Evett v. Detntff , 330 F.3d 681, 687 (5th Cir. 2003).
To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, two questions must be answered: (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the incident. See Hare v. City of Corinth , 135 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Colston v. Barnhart , 130 F. 3d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Clearly Established Law
To overcome a claim of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must establish that the right an official is alleged to have violated was “clearly established,” i.e., sufficiently clearly defined that “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
Election of Defendant(s): Suit Against Governmental Unit May Claim Against Government Employee
Section 101.106 of the Texas Tort Claims Act provides that a judgment in an action against a governmental entity bars any action against an employee arising out of the same subject matter. Schauer v. Morgan, 175 S.W.3d 397, 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The purpose of section 101.106 is to protect employees of a governmental unit from liability when a judgment or settlement has been obtained from the government employer pursuant to a claim under chapter 101 of the Texas Tort Claims Act. Sykes, 136 S.W. 3d at 640.
The relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff’s claims against the governmental entity arise under the Texas Tort Claims Act. See Bell v. Love, 923 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
Once a plaintiff invokes the Texas Tort Claims Act to bring a cause of action against a governmental entity, he is bound by the limitations and remedies provided in the statute. State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Dopyera, 834 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex. 1992).