Discussion
DART argues the trial
court did not have jurisdiction for five reasons. First, DART argues its status as a governmental entity provides it
with immunity from ATU 1338's lawsuit. Second, DART argues it has not waived its
immunity. Third, DART asserts it has not taken affirmative action to invoke the
trial court's jurisdiction. Fourth, DART maintains federal law does not preempt
state law to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. Fifth, DART argues ATU
1338's sole redress is through an administrative grievance process. Our
resolution of the fourth argument is dispositive of the appeal. See Tex.
R. App. P. 47.1. DART's first, second, third, and fifth arguments are premised
upon governmental immunity. We conclude the federal Urban Mass Transportation
Act (UMTA) preempts state governmental immunity law in this case. See 49
U.S.C.A. § 5333(b) (West Supp. 2005) (formerly designated as section 13(c)
and referred to as section 13(c) in case law).
“If a state law conflicts
with federal law, it is preempted and has no effect.” Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Estate of Wells, 52
S.W.3d 737, 743 (Tex. 2001); see also U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“The
laws of the United States are the 'supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding'”) (quoted
in Great Dane Trailers, 52 S.W.3d at 743). Preemption may be express or
implied. See Great Dane Trailers, 52 S.W.3d at 743. Federal law may
impliedly preempt state law if it is impossible for a private party to comply
with both state and federal requirements or if state law obstructs accomplishing
and executing Congress's full purposes and objectives. Great Dane
Trailers, 52 S.W.3d at 743; see also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861, 882 (2000) (because rule of state tort law upon which plaintiffs
sued would have stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of”
important objectives of federal motor vehicle safety standard, it was
preempted).
ATU 1338 contends
application of state governmental immunity law would thwart Congress's intent and the purposes of the UMTA. The United States
Supreme Court discussed the purposes of the UMTA in Jackson Transit Authority
v. Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15 (1982). At a
time when many private transportation companies across the country were in
“precarious financial condition,” the UMTA “was designed in part to provide
federal aid for local governments in acquiring failing private transit companies
so that communities could continue to receive the benefits of mass
transportation despite the collapse of the private operations.” Jackson
Transit Auth., 457 U.S. at 17. Congress was also aware, however, “that
public ownership might threaten existing collective-bargaining rights of
unionized transit workers employed by private companies.” Jackson Transit
Auth., 457 U.S. at 17. The Court continued,
If, for example, state law forbade
collective bargaining by state and local government employees, the workers might lose their collective- bargaining rights
when a private company was acquired by a local government. To prevent federal
funds from being used to destroy the collective-bargaining rights of organized
workers, Congress included § 13(c) in the Act. Section 13(c) requires, as a
condition of federal assistance under the Act, that the Secretary of Labor
certify that “fair and equitable arrangements” have been made “to protect the
interests of employees affected by [the] assistance.” The statute lists several
protective steps that must be taken before a local government may receive
federal aid . . . . The protective arrangements must be specified in the
contract granting federal aid.
Jackson Transit Auth., 457
U.S. at 17-18 (citations omitted).
The Jackson Transit
Authority Court noted Congress's concern that state law may forbid collective bargaining by state and local
government employees, and thus “workers might lose their collective-bargaining
rights when a private company was acquired by a local government.” See
Jackson Transit Auth., 457 U.S. at 17. In Texas, state law does prohibit
collective bargaining by government employees. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §
617.002 (Vernon 2004) (official of state or political subdivision may not enter
into collective bargaining contract with labor organization regarding wages,
hours, or conditions of employment of public employees; any such contract void).
DART, however, is a party to an “Arrangement Pursuant to Section 13(c) of the
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964,” under which DART agreed the “existing
rights of employees covered by this Arrangement to present grievances concerning
their wages, hours of work, or conditions of work, individually or through a
representative . . . shall be preserved and continued.” Arrangement Pursuant
to Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, ¶ 4.
DART makes annual certifications and assurances of its compliance with federal
law and regulations to the Federal Transit Authority to obtain federal
assistance, and a significant portion of DART's annual budget is derived from
federal funds. Thus, the 13(c) arrangement between DART and ATU 1338 is
consistent with Congress's intent “to prevent federal funds from being used to
destroy the collective- bargaining rights of organized workers.” See Jackson
Transit Auth., 457 U.S. at 17.
While the issue in
Jackson Transit Authority was whether Congress intended to create federal causes of action for breaches of section
13(c) agreements and collective bargaining contracts, see Jackson Transit
Auth., 457 U.S. at 21, 29, the Court noted “it is reasonable to conclude
that Congress expected the § 13(c) agreement and the collective-bargaining
agreement, like ordinary contracts, to be enforceable by private suit upon a
breach.” Jackson Transit Auth., 457 U.S. at 20- 21. The Court concluded
the contracts at issue were to be governed by state, not federal, law. See
Jackson Transit Auth., 457 U.S. at 29. The Court explained, “Congress
designed § 13(c) as a means to accommodate state law to collective
bargaining, not as a means to substitute a federal law of collective bargaining
for state labor law.” Jackson Transit Auth., 457 U.S. at
28.
We have also noted
“arrangements under section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act are not collective bargaining contracts,” but are
“contracts, albeit contracts required by federal statute.” Dallas Area Rapid
Transit v. Plummer, 841 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ
denied), abrogated in part on other grounds by Tex. Educ. Agency v.
Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex. 1992) (Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act waives governmental immunity for awards of attorneys' fees). Section 13(c)
protective arrangements are “valid and enforceable in state courts.”
Plummer, 841 S.W.2d at 874. “Employees covered by a section 13(c)
agreement, or their union, may bring a contract action in state court to enforce
the agreement.” Plummer, 841 S.W.2d at 874 (citing Jackson Transit
Auth., 457 U.S. at 29 n.13).
DART argues ATU 1338's
claim is not for breach of a section 13(c) arrangement, but only for breach of the resolution agreement. We
disagree. The general grievance resolution agreement recites that ATU 1338's
grievance was addressed “in conformity with Section 8.10 of the DART Hourly
Employment Manual and Section 617.005 of the Government Code and DART's
[Section] 13(c) Capital Arrangement certified by the Department of Labor on
September 30, 1991.” As we noted in Plummer, “DART's personnel policy
manual contains the grievance procedure properly promulgated pursuant to section
13(c) and, as part of the section 13(c) agreement, is binding on DART.”
Plummer, 841 S.W.2d at 874. We concluded in Plummer the trial
court “was correct in finding that DART has a contractual duty to implement the
Trial Board's award and that failing to do so constitutes a breach of that
duty.” Plummer, 841 S.W.2d at 874. As in Plummer, ATU 1338 “may
bring a contract action in state court to enforce the agreement.” See
Plummer, 841 S.W.2d at 874.
Assuming state law
provides that DART, as a governmental entity, is immune from suit, this immunity would obstruct accomplishing and executing
Congress's full purposes and objectives under the UMTA. See Great Dane
Trailers, 52 S.W.3d at 743; Geier, 529 U.S. at 882. The UMTA, as
interpreted in Jackson Transit Authority, is clear: state law is to
control labor relations between local governments and unionized transit workers,
as long as the workers' collective-bargaining rights are preserved before a
local government receives federal aid. See Jackson Transit Auth., 457
U.S. at 17, 27. Congress designed section 13(c) of the UMTA “as a means to
accommodate state law to collective bargaining.” Jackson Transit Auth.,
457 U.S. at 27. Although section 13(c) may be narrowly drafted to minimize its
effects on state labor law, Congress's clear intent was to preserve
collective-bargaining rights. Where state immunity law would preclude
enforcement of the rights preserved under section 13(c), Congress's objectives
could not be accomplished. Therefore, state immunity law “is preempted and has
no effect.” See Great Dane Trailers, 52 S.W.3d at 743.
Not all
conflicts between federal statutes and state immunity laws result in
preemption. The United States Supreme Court held
the State of Maine was immune from a suit by its employees under the Federal
Fair Labor Standards Act because Congress cannot abrogate a state's sovereign
immunity. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (applying sovereign
immunity pursuant to Eleventh Amendment of United States Constitution). The rule
in Alden, however, does not apply to DART in this case because DART is
not an “arm of the state.” See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 (sovereign immunity
bars suits against State or “arm of the state” but not lesser governmental
entity); Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 F.3d 315, 322 (5th
Cir.) (DART not “arm of the state” entitled to assert federal Eleventh Amendment
immunity in case under Age Discrimination in Employment Act), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1042 (2001); see also Hoff v. Nueces County, 153
S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar
suit against “lesser entities” such as county). As noted in Alden,
“certain limits are implicit in the constitutional principle of sovereign
immunity;” it “does not bar all judicial review of state compliance with the
Constitution and valid federal law.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 755. Here, state
immunity law does not bar judicial review of ATU 1338's claims.
We affirm the
trial court's denial of DART's plea to the jurisdiction.
MARK
WHITTINGTON
JUSTICE
050241F.P05
File Date[10/14/2005]
File Name[050241F]
File
Locator[10/14/2005-050241F]