Affirmed and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed May 4, 2006.

 

 

In The

 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

 

NO. 14-04-00658-CV

____________

 

BARBARA ROBINSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN ROBINSON, DECEASED, Appellant

 

V.

 

CROWN CORK & SEAL COMPANY, INC., Appellee

 

 

On Appeal from the 55th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2002-50324A

 

 

M A J O R I T Y   O P I N I O N

At its essence, this appeal requires us to consider the breadth of the Legislature=s power to curtail individual rights.  John and Barbara Robinson sued Crown Cork and others after discovering Mr. Robinson had developed mesothelioma from years of working with products containing asbestos.  In the trial court, Crown Cork admitted liability; however, before the court entered judgment, the Legislature enactedCand made immediately effectiveCa law that would preclude any recovery by the Robinsons from Crown Cork. 

The Legislature, concerned about the financial toll of asbestos suits, limited the liability of corporations that (1) had purchased companies manufacturing asbestos, but (2) did not continue in the asbestos business.  By making the legislation effective immediately, the Legislature affected the Robinsons= suit.  Crown Cork moved for summary judgment, arguing that the legislation exempted it from paying any damages to the Robinsons because the damages it had already paid to other plaintiffs exceeded the monetary cap contained in the legislation.  The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Crown Cork.

Mrs. Robinson^[1] attacks the summary judgment on three grounds, two of which are constitutional in nature.  First, Mrs. Robinson claims that the legislation is unconstitutionally retroactive as applied to her because it extinguished a vested right.  Next, she claims that the law is unconstitutional because it is a special law, designed specifically to aid Crown Cork.  Finally, she claims that Crown Cork failed to establish as a matter of law each element of its affirmative defense.

As to Mrs. Robinson=s first issue, we agree that the legislation acted retroactively upon her claims.  But we do not conclude that the legislation is unconstitutionally retroactive as applied to Mrs. Robinson because it was a Avalid exercise of the police power by the Legislature to safeguard the public safety and welfare . . . .@  Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 633B34 (Tex. 1996).

Regarding Mrs. Robinson=s second constitutional claimCthat the statute is unconstitutional because it is a special lawCwe conclude the statute is not a special law.  Clearly it was drafted to include Crown Cork within its scope, but it was not written to exclude companies similarly situated to Crown Cork.  And, because it operates on a subject in which the public at large is interested, it affects all of the citizens of the State.  

Finally, we hold that Crown Cork proved the elements of its affirmative defense as a matter of law.  Consequently, we affirm the trial court=s judgment.  We explain below.

Factual Background

John Robinson joined the United States Navy in 1956, and served for approximately twenty years as a boiler tender on several Navy vessels.  Mr. Robinson maintained boilers, pipes, steam lines, and other machinery and equipment insulated with asbestos products, including insulation products of Mundet Cork Corporation.

Crown Cork is a manufacturer and distributor of packaging products for consumer goods.  In 1963, Crown Cork, then a New York corporation, was the nation=s largest producer and seller of metal bottle caps, known in the industry as Acrowns.@  Mundet also produced and sold crowns.  Seeking to acquire the assets of Mundet=s competing bottle cap division, in November of 1963, Crown Cork purchased the majority of Mundet stock.  Approximately three months later, Mundet sold its insulation division.^[2]  Crown Cork continued to purchase Mundet stock until February of 1966, when the remaining assets of Mundet were transferred to Crown Cork by merger.  In 1989, Crown Cork merged into a new Pennsylvania corporation of the same name.

Years later, John Robinson was diagnosed with mesothelioma.  He and his wife, Barbara, sued Crown Cork, Mundet=s successor, and others for damages caused by Mr. Robinson=s exposure to asbestos.  The Robinsons moved for partial summary judgment to establish Crown Cork=s liability for the damages allegedly caused by Mundet=s products.  Crown Cork did not contest its liability for compensatory damages.  The trial court granted the Robinsons= motion as to compensatory damages, but not as to punitive damages.

While the Robinsons= suit was pending, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 4; House Bill 4 included a new affirmative defense limiting the liability of successor corporations for asbestos-related claims.  See Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847.  Section 17 of House Bill 4 directly impacted the Robinsons= suit.  That section provides that certain successor corporations of asbestos manufacturers may limit their total asbestos liability to the total gross asset value of the predecessor company at the time of the merger or consolidation.  Id. ' 17.01.  The only section of House Bill 4 made immediately effective upon its passage by two-thirds of each house of the Legislature was Section 17; it became effective on June 11, 2003.  See Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, ' 23.02(b), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 898, 899.  In addition, the only section made retroactive to all cases pending on its effective date was, again, Section 17.  See Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, ' 17.02(2), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 895.  Section 17 is codified at Chapter 149 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, entitled ALimitations in Civil Actions of Liabilities Relating to Certain Mergers or Consolidations.@  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. '' 149.001B.006.  Throughout the remainder of the opinion we will refer to Section 17 as Athe Statute.@

The stated purpose of the Statute is to limit cumulative Asuccessor asbestos-related liabilities@^[3] in Texas.  A successor corporation is liable for asbestos claims^[4] only up to the total gross assets of the transferor corporation from whom it received the asbestos-related liabilities; total gross assets are determined as of the time of the merger or consolidation.  See id. ' 149.003(a); see also id. '' 149.001(4) (defining Asuccessor@ as Aa corporation that assumes or incurs, or has assumed or incurred, successor asbestos-related liabilities@); 149.001(5) (defining Atransferor@ as Aa corporation from which successor asbestos-related liabilities are or were assumed or incurred@).^[5]  A successor corporation is not responsible for successor asbestos-related liabilities that exceed this limitation.  Id. ' 149.003(a).  Additionally, the Statute provides that, if a transferor corporation had assumed or incurred successor asbestos-related liabilities from a prior merger or consolidation with a transferor, then the fair market value of the total assets of the first transferor shall be used to determine the successor corporation=s liability.  Id. ' 149.003(b).  To the fullest extent permissible, Texas law applies to successor asbestos-related liabilities.  See id. ' 149.006 (AThe courts in this state shall apply, to the fullest extent permissible under the United States Constitution, this state=s substantive law, including the limitation under this chapter, to the issue of successor asbestos‑related liabilities.@).

As noted previously, after the Statute became effective, Crown Cork moved for summary judgment.  Crown Cork argued that it had already paid successor asbestos claims in excess of Mundet=s total gross assets, and therefore, it had no further liability in any asbestos case.^[6]  The trial court granted the motion and severed the Robinsons= claims against Crown Cork from those against the other defendants.  This appeal followed.

Robinson=s Issues

On appeal, Mrs. Robinson raises three issues, contending the trial court erred in granting Crown Cork=s motion for summary judgment because (1) the Statute violates the Texas Constitution=s prohibition on retroactive laws, (2) the Statute violates the Texas Constitution=s prohibition on special laws, and (3) Crown Cork failed to establish as a matter of law each element of the Statute.

I.        The Statute Does Not Violate the Texas Constitution=s Prohibition on Retroactive Laws.

In her first issue, Mrs. Robinson contends the Statute violates Article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution.  That section provides as follows:   ANo bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.@  Tex. Const. art I, ' 16.  Mrs. Robinson does not contend section 16 bans all retroactive laws.  Instead, she argues vested rights cannot be extinguished retroactively; she maintains that an accrued cause of action is a vested right and thus not retroactively extinguishable.  She asserts that her accrued tort claims were vested before the Statute became effective and therefore could not be extinguished by subsequently enacted legislation.  Yet, she argues, the Statute completely eliminated the accrued tort claims against Crown Cork in contravention of section 16.^[7]

We do not find the law on vested rights to be as consistent and lucid as Mrs. Robinson claims.  For this reason, as we explain below, we choose not to employ a vested-rights analysis to assess the Statute=s constitutionality.  Instead, we conclude that we may look to the police power of the Legislature to find authority for the Statute=s enactment and for its validationCin spite of its retroactivity.  The Legislature may exercise its police power to balance competing individual and societal interests and to enact legislation that reasonably responds to the issues and interests before it.  That power and responsibility goes to the very essence of the Legislature=s role in our tripartite democratic system.

A.      The Case Law on Vested Rights is Inconsistent and Difficult to Use as a Guide.

Courts have struggled for years to settle upon a reliable method for judging the constitutionality of a retroactive statute.  Many Texas courts and courts of other states have used the designation Avested right@ to describe a right that cannot be abrogated by a retroactive law.  See, e.g., Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light, 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556, 560 (1916); Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 3 S.W. 249, 253 (1887); Phillips v. Curiale, 608 A.2d 895, 901B02 (N.J. 1992); Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 173 N.W.2d 353, 356B358 (Minn. 1969); see also Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696 (1960); Ray H. Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 540, 561B62 (1956).  But a problem arises when one tries to define a vested right.  Some Texas cases arguably have used language implying that an accrued cause of action is a vested right.  See Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 253 (AWhen . . . a state of facts exists as the law declares shall entitle a plaintiff relief in a court of justice on a claim which he makes against another . . ., then it must be said that a right exists, has become fixed or vested, and is beyond the reach of retroactive legislation . . . .@); but see Ex Parte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255, 261 (Tex. 1981) (A[A] right cannot be considered a vested right unless it is something more than such a mere expectation as may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the present general laws; it must have become a title, legal or equitable to the present or future enjoyment of a demand or a legal exemption from the demand made by another.@).  Other cases have held that a right is not vested until a final judgment is entered.  See Walls v. First State Bank of Miami, 900 S.W.2d 117, 122 (Tex. App.CAmarillo 1995, writ denied) (stating that Aonly final, nonreviewable judgments will be accorded the dignity of vested, constitutionally guarded rights . . . .@); Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 798 S.W.2d 580, 589 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (stating that Athe triggering event for the vesting of a right is the resolution of the controversy and the final determination . . . .@).

Thus, our predicament in answering the precise question Mrs. Robinson has raisedCwhether her allegedly vested right was retroactively altered in an unconstitutional wayCis this:  no clear answer exists.  For example, Mrs. Robinson declares that her tort claims were vested rights because the set of facts underlying her cause of action had already occurred.  This long has been a way of describing vested rights.  See Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 253B54.  But even this designation is subject to variances in application, as the following quote, written more than seventy-five years ago, illustrates:

One=s first impulse on undertaking to discuss retroactive laws and vested rights is to define a vested right.  But when it appears, as soon happens, that this is impossible, one decides to fix the attention upon retroactive laws and leave the matter of definition to follow rather than precede the discussion, assuming for the purpose that a right is vested when it is immune to destruction, and that it is not vested when it is liable to destruction, by retroactive legislation.  The simplification of the task which this plan seems to involve, turns out to be something of an illusion, however, when it appears, as also soon happens, that one=s preconceived notions of retroactive laws are irreconcilable with the data with which one has to deal.

Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 231, 231 (1927) (footnote omitted).  Apparently, the job of ascertaining when a right is vested, and when it is not, has vexed courts and commentators for years.

B.      Some Courts Have Looked to Alternative Methods to Assess When a Statute is Unconstitutionally Retroactive.

Courts in other states also have recognized the dilemma they confront when an allegedly vested right is pitted against a retroactive law: 

A[D]iscerning commentators and judges@ have questioned the value of vested-rights analysis and have suggested that Athe true test of the constitutionality of a retrospective law is whether a party has changed his [or her] position in reliance upon the existing law, or whether the retrospective act gives effect to or defeats the reasonable expectations of the parties.@  Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696 (1960) (Hochman) (footnotes omitted).  Although agreeing that the parties= reasonable expectations may be relevant, Hochman has argued that the constitutionality of a retroactive statute is in fact determined by courts through a weighing of the following factors: (1) the nature and strength of the public interest served by the statute, (2) the extent to which the statute modifies or abrogates the asserted right, and (3) the nature of the right that the statute alters.  Id. at 697.  In Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974), we applied a similar test to determine whether a retroactively‑applied statute constituted a deprivation of due process.  We said in Rothman that that analysis essentially involves asking whether, after examining the importance of the public interest served by the statute and comparing it with and balancing it against the quality and value of the right affected by the retroactive legislation, [one could conclude] that the statute in question represented a valid exercise of police power, despite the * * * clear incursion upon individual private rights. [Id. at 226, 320 A.2d 496.]  See also Berkley Condominium Ass=n v. Berkley Condominium Residences, Inc., 185 N.J. Super. 313, 320, 448 A.2d 510 (Ch. Div.1982) (when determining what rights may become vested, Aone must examine what it is that is being taken away and weigh that loss against the social gain being achieved@).

Phillips, 608 A.2d at 902; see also Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assoc., 772 A.2d 368, 379B83 (N.J. 2001) (noting that New Jersey courts have had difficulty clearly defining Avested right@ and choosing to use a Arational basis@ inquiry rather than a Avested rights@ inquiry).

The Texas Supreme Court also has acknowledged the quandary.  See Texas Water Rights Comm=n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 648B49 (Tex. 1971).  Justice Pope, speaking for the Court, acknowledged the confusion in the case law, noting that A[a] number of scholars have endeavored to discover the underlying rationale for the cases which either uphold or strike down a statute which is attacked as unconstitutionally retroactive.@  Id. at 649.  Justice Pope then briefly discussed several alternative methods commentators have relied on to determine if a law was unconstitutionally retroactive.^[8]  Id.

In light of the inconsistency surrounding vested rights and the apparent difficulty in determining if a right is vested, we will follow Justice Pope=s lead and use a gauge other than vested rights to measure the Statute=s constitutionality. 

C.      The Legislature=s Police Power to Enact Retroactive Laws.

Facing claims that a statute unconstitutionally abrogated allegedly vested rights, a number of older Texas court of appeals opinions have resolved the issue by considering the Legislature=s police power.  See, e.g., Texas State Teachers Ass=n v. State, 711 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. App.CAustin 1986, writ ref=d n.r.e.); Ismail v. Ismail, 702 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref=d n.r.e.); State Bd. of Registration for Prof=l Eng=rs v. Wichita Eng=g Co., 504 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.CFort Worth 1973, writ ref=d n.r.e.); City of Breckenridge v. Cozart, 478 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. Civ. App.CEastland 1972, writ ref=d n.r.e.); City of Coleman v. Rhone, 222 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. Civ. App.CEastland 1949, writ ref=d.).  The Texas Supreme Court also has done this, most recently relying on the police power to validate a retroactive statute in Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation District, 925 S.W.2d 618, 633B34 (Tex. 1996).  Barshop gives scant guidance on how to measure the legitimacy of an act of police power against a private right.  Fortunately, a number of the courts of appeals considering the issue have written rather extensively on the balancing of rights they have performed when comparing a statute with the private right that is being altered.  After looking generally at the scope of the police power, we will then follow the lead of these courts by considering the reasons the legislature enacted the Statute, including precautions taken to narrow the scope of the Statute=s reach.  Then, we will measure those legislative justifications against the private rights the Statute impacts.

1.       The Legislature=s Police Power.

Although Mrs. Robinson strenuously argues that we cannot rely on the police power to validate the Statute, we disagree.  In fact, we are of the opinion that the enactment of the Statute was a reasonable exercise of the Legislature=s police power. 

Many courts have spoken to the breadth of the police power.  Though not unfettered, it is Abroad and comprehensive.@  Rhone, 222 S.W.2d at 648.  AIt is founded upon public necessity which alone can justify its exercise@ and Ahinges upon the public need for safety, health, security, and protection of the general welfare of the community.@  Id.  

When a statute is attacked as violating the retroactivity clause, the language of the clause must be balanced against the state=s interest in exercising its police power.  See Texas State Teachers Ass=n v. State, 711 S.W.2d at 425.  AAlthough the language of the [retroactivity] clause is facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the state >to safeguard the interests of its people.=@  Id. at 424 (quoting Energy Reserves v. Kan. Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400, 103 S. Ct. 697, 74 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1983)).  For this reason, we must balance the two, and, for this reason, Athe nature of the power being exercised by the state is important in determining whether any resulting impairment is permissible.@  Id. at 425; see also Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 275 S.W.2d 951, 955 (1955) (stating that the Legislature may withdraw a common-law remedy for a well-established common-law cause of action when it is a reasonable exercise of police power in the interest of the general welfare); Cozart, 478 S.W.2d at 165 (APolice power is not static and unchanging.  As the affairs of the people and government change and progress, so the police power changes and progresses to meet the needs.@). 

2.       The Statute=s Purpose.

Certainly the fiscal health of this State and its inhabitants contributes to the welfare of the citizenry and is an important concern of the public at large.  The fiscal health of the State and its inhabitants were the main goals of this legislation.  We quote extensively from the Statement of Legislative Intent accompanying the Statute to illustrate the reasonableness of the Statute=s purpose and the Legislature=s attempts to make its impact as narrow as possible:

CThere was concern that the benefits of this legislation should be limited in some way to those successor corporations who were the most innocent about the potential hazards of asbestos;

CThere was further concern that the benefits should be limited in some way to innocent successors who were also at the greatest financial peril, especially those threatened with bankruptcy;

CThere was also concern that the legislature should test this new concept by taking one step at a time and providing realistic relief to those innocent successor corporations most at peril financially without limiting every type of asbestos liability.

In order to meet these concerns, the limitations on total liability were themselves narrowed or restricted in three waysCby two restrictions premised upon the innocence of the successor and one based upon financial viability.

To focus the benefits upon innocent successor corporations, two restrictions were added:

CUnder ' 149.002(a), the original transfer of successor asbestos liabilities has to have occurred prior to May 13, 1968.  Of course, subsequent successors who receive only that same bundle of original asbestos liabilities through successive mergers will also be entitled to the liability limits applicable to that first successor pre‑1968 no matter when the later mergers occur.

It wasn=t until the mid‑1960s that Dr. Irving Selikoff issued his now famous warnings about the dangers of asbestos in the workplace.  The earliest date after Selikoff=s warnings when even a quasi‑governmental organization in the United States suggested a tighter standard for asbestos in the workplace was, however, May 13, 1968.  On that date, the influential American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) first adopted a change in the recommended, longstanding threshold limit for asbestos in the air of a workplace from 5 mppcf to 2 mppcf (the ACGIH 1958 Standard).

A successor corporation would therefore have been much less likely to be aware of the hazards of asbestos prior to May 13, 1968.  By requiring that the first transfer of asbestos liabilities to a successor occurred prior to May 13, 1968, the legislation therefore focuses its benefits upon innocent successors.

COne class of successors might, however, have been less innocent than others:  those in the asbestos business.  Therefore, ' 149.002(b)(5) restricts the benefits of the legislation to successor corporations that did not continue the predecessor=s asbestos business:  the business of mining asbestos, of selling or distributing asbestos fibers, or of manufacturing, distributing, installing, or removing asbestos products.  A successor that did not merge with a predecessor in order to continue that predecessor=s asbestos business was less likely to have known of the hazards of asbestos.  For example, a successor that was merely trying to acquire a predecessor=s non‑asbestos line of business would be less knowledgeable about asbestos than a successor who wanted to continue a predecessor=s asbestos line of business.  A successor that did not continue the asbestos business of its predecessor also could not have caused any of the injuries that arose from the discontinued asbestos business.

Together, the preceding restrictions limit the benefits of the statute to those who were more innocent than others and were unwittingly saddled with often massive longtail liabilities only because of a merger.

The third restriction in the legislation deals primarily with the issue of financial viability.  Corporations actually in the asbestos business and their successors through merger have been financially drained by decades of litigation.  As a result, nearly 70 such corporations have sought protection through bankruptcy.  The cost in jobs and pension benefits, to cite just two examples, has been substantial.  This legislation seeks to help keep remaining hard‑pressed successors out of bankruptcy.  In an effort to help those most in need first, the legislation focuses upon the most hard‑pressed of successors, rather than all successors.  Any successor would be liableCeven beyond the total gross asset value of its predecessorCfor any asbestos‑related premises liabilities it received from a predecessor for injuries caused on premises the successor continued to own or control after a merger.  Such successors have not thus far been so financially burdened by litigation as the successors to those in the asbestos business itself.  Unlike successors to those in the asbestos business, much greater insurance resources remain available to successors facing premises liability claims.  In addition, successor liability for premises claims are still protected under the legislation in the case of any premises the successor did not continue to own or control after the merger.  That distinction shows additional concern for successors who are likely to be more innocent of having caused any injury themselves.  Such successors may also still qualify for limits upon other successor asbestos‑related liabilities that are not based upon premises liability claims.

A last item worth noting is that the liability limits provided by this legislation do not apply to anyone already in bankruptcy.  It is the purpose of this legislation to help keep corporations out of bankruptcy, not to assist corporations already in bankruptcy.  In order to avoid encouraging any rush to force a corporation into bankruptcy in order to avoid the liability limits imposed by this legislation, the liability limits will apply if a corporation is forced into bankruptcy after April 1, 2003.

H.J. of Tex., 78th Leg., R.S. 6043B45 (2003).

3.       A Reasonable Exercise of Police Power.

Courts of this State have held that two considerations determine whether a legislative act is valid under the police power: (1) whether the act is appropriate and reasonably necessary to accomplish a purpose within the scope of the police power, and (2) whether the ordinance is reasonable by not being arbitrary and unjust or whether the effect on individuals is unduly harsh so that it is out of proportion to the end sought to be accomplished.  Martin v. Wholesome Dairy, Inc., 437 S.W.2d 586, 591 (Tex. Civ. App.CAustin 1969, writ ref=d n.r.e.) (citing Rhone, 222 S.W.2d at 648).  AIf there is room for a fair difference of opinion as to the necessity and reasonableness of a legislative enactment . . . on a subject which lies within the police power, the courts will not hold it void.@  Id. at 592.  Applying these considerations to this case, we conclude that the Statute is a reasonable exercise of the Legislature=s police power. 

First, the purpose for which it was enactedCthe financial viability of the State and businesses in the StateCis a valid exercise of police power.  The purpose recites that nearly seventy companies have filed for bankruptcy, exacting a heavy toll in both jobs and pension benefits.  Evidence before the trial court showed that asbestos lawsuits have negatively impacted Crown Cork=s financial vigor.  Moreover, by enacting the Statute, the Legislature impacted over 1,000 lawsuits against Crown Cork in courts across the State.^[9]  In addition, Crown Cork=s summary judgment evidence shows that Crown Cork=s financial viability alone is important to citizens in all parts of the State; its subsidiaries and affiliates have about 1,000 employees across the State, and roughly the same number of retirees relying on its continued financial viability for their own and their families= financial security as they age.  The citizens of the three municipalities in which Crown Cork=s plants are located across the stateCSugar Land, Conroe, and AbileneChave an interest in Crown Cork=s continued financial viability.  Thus, the Statute benefits the entire economy of the State, an appropriate purpose for which to exercise the police power.

Second, the Legislature limited the Statute=s detrimental impact on plaintiffs such as the Robinsons so that the impact was not out of proportion to the end sought.  See Martin, 437 S.W.2d at 591.  The requirements restrict the number of corporations that qualify for the limitation of liability, and therefore leave the pool of potential defendants as large as possible for claimants having valid claims for damages resulting from asbestos products.  The Statute was limited in scope to target those corporations most in need of financial relief and/or assistanceCthose corporations subject to asbestos suits and payouts because they purchased companies that manufactured asbestos.  The Statute also restricts its scope to those companies who are least responsible for the continued manufacture of asbestos and, therefore, least responsible for the continued negative impact of asbestos-related health problems on the public.  As a result, Crown Cork was the only defendant of the number of companies the Robinsons sued that was able to take advantage of the Statute.

In short, we find the Statute (1) within the Legislature=s police power and (2) narrowly tailored (a) to protect the most innocent corporations hard hit by asbestos litigation but (b) to leave the potential pool of asbestos defendants as large as possible.  Although Mrs. Robinson claims that the Statute is unconstitutional, we find that her claims at most show that room for a fair difference of opinion exists as to the necessity and reasonableness of the Statute.  By enacting the Statute, we conclude that the Legislature performed its unique role within our democratic system by making a judgment call on an issue uniquely within its purview and within its police power.  Finding a reasonable basis for that decision, we decline to declare it void.

For these reasons, we conclude that the Statute was a valid exercise of the State=s police power and that the Statute was not unconstitutionally retroactive.

4.       Robinson=s Case Law Does Not Contradict This Conclusion.

Mrs. Robinson argues that we cannot rely on police power to validate the retroactive effect of the statute on her accrued rights.  She relies on two cases to undergird her argument the police power is a facile, potentially all-encompassing doctrine that we should not rely on to validate this retroactive statute.  Those cases are City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1997), and Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R. & D., Inc., 12 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 1999)Cboth Texas Supreme Court opinions involving retroactive laws that altered allegedly vested rights.  In evaluating the validity of the retroactive laws in these cases, the Supreme Court did not consider the Legislature=s police power.  According to Mrs. Robinson, this is proof that the police power cannot be used to validate a law that has altered retroactively a vested right.  We disagree because we are of the opinion that the court had alternative, and more straight-forward means of evaluating those laws.

For example, in Likes, the Court relied on a long-standing method of evaluating the constitutionality of a statute that retroactively abridged an allegedly vested right.  Likes sued the City of Tyler for negligent maintenance of a culvert.  Likes, 962 S.W.2d at 502.  At common law, maintenance of culverts was a proprietary function for which the City of Tyler could be sued.  However, the Legislature amended the Texas Tort Claims Act, reclassifying the operation of culverts as a governmental function for which property damages claims could not be brought.  Id.  By the time Likes sued the City of Tyler, the City was immune from suit for the damages.  Id.  The Court held that the statute affected a remedy only, noting that Alaws affecting a remedy are not unconstitutionally retroactive unless the remedy is entirely taken away.@  Id.  In the enactment of the statute, Athe Legislature affected the remedy but allowed Likes a reasonable time to preserve her rights.@  Id.  Because the Legislature provided Likes and others a grace period within which they could have exercised their remedy before its alteration, the statute was not unconstitutionally retroactive.  See id.

Likewise, a simple answer was available to the court in Keco.  There, the Legislature extended the statute of limitations for a particular cause of action brought against Baker Hughes, thus making Baker Hughes potentially liable on a cause of action that would have been barred by the previous law.  Keco, 12 S.W.3d at 2.  As in Likes, the court relied on a firmly established ruleCthat a cause cannot be revived after it is barred by the statute of limitationsCto hold that the legislation was unconstitutionally retroactive.  Id. at 4; see also Wilson v. Work, 122 Tex. 545, 62 S.W.2d 490, 490B91 (1933); Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 254B55.

Thus, unlike this case, in both Keco and Likes, the Court had rather simple, straightforward answers available to it.  There was no reason for the Court to consider the Legislature=s police power.  For this reason, we do not interpret the Court=s silence on the Legislature=s police power as a statement that the police power did not apply, or could not be applied, to the cases. 

More importantly, the Supreme Court and other courts of this state have used the Legislature=s police power to validate retroactive statutes that are allegedly unconstitutional.  See Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 633B34 (citing cases).  In Barshop, the Court held, A[a] valid exercise of the police power by the Legislature to safeguard the public safety and welfare can prevail over a finding that a law is unconstitutionally retroactive.@  Barshop, 924 S.W.2d at 633B34.^[10]

D.      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court=s Ieropoli Decision is Not Persuasive.

Mrs. Robinson also urges us to apply the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Ieropoli v. AC&S Corp., 842 A.2d 919, 932 (Pa. 2004), in which that court held that a similar statute enacted in Pennsylvania was unconstitutional as applied under the Pennsylvania Constitution.  The Ieropoli court found that the statute eliminated all remedy for an accrued cause of action, and because Aan accrued cause of action is a vested right,@ it could not be eliminated by subsequent legislation.  Id. at 930, 932.  However, in several significant ways, the Ieropoli decision is quite different from this appeal.

To begin with, Ieropoli rested on a different constitutional provision than this appeal.  The plaintiff, Ieropoli, alleged that the pertinent Pennsylvania statute violated that state=s open courts provision contained in the state constitution.  Here, Mrs. Robinson alleges the Statute violates this state=s constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws, not the open courts provision. 

Next, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used a vested rights analysis to strike down that state=s statute, pointing out Pennsylvania=s unwavering historical stance, as evidenced in the case law, that an accrued cause of action is a vested right that cannot be extinguished.  It appears from Ieropoli that Pennsylvania courts have applied vested rights analysis in a much more consistent manner than have Texas courts.  As already noted, we have chosen to eschew a vested rights analysis for what we consider to be a more reliable analysis.

Finally, the most important differences appear in the statutes themselves.  The Pennsylvania statute was not as narrowly drawn as the Statute.  The Pennsylvania statute does not appear to have been crafted to encompass only the most innocent successor corporations.  While the Statute requires that a corporation must have purchased the asbestos division before May 13, 1968 and must not have manufactured asbestos itself, the Pennsylvania statute had neither of these winnowing characteristics.

For all of these reasons, we do not find Ieropoli persuasive authority.

E.      Summary of Holding on Robinson=s First Issue.

In summary, we hold that the Statute is not unconstitutionally retroactive as applied to Mrs. Robinson=s claims because it is a valid exercise of the Legislature=s police power.  The Statute, therefore, does not violate Article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution.  We overrule Mrs. Robinson=