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Affirmed and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed May 4,
2006. In
The Fourteenth Court
of Appeals ____________ NO. 14-04-00658-CV ____________ BARBARA
ROBINSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN
ROBINSON, DECEASED,
Appellant V. CROWN CORK
& SEAL COMPANY, INC.,
Appellee
On
Appeal from the 55th District
Court Harris County,
Texas Trial
Court Cause No. 2002-50324A
M A J O R
I T Y O P I N I O
N At its
essence, this appeal requires us to consider the breadth of the
Legislature=s power to
curtail individual rights.
John and Barbara Robinson sued Crown Cork and others after
discovering Mr. Robinson had developed mesothelioma from years of working
with products containing asbestos.
In the trial court, Crown Cork admitted liability; however, before
the court entered judgment, the Legislature enactedCand made
immediately effectiveCa law that
would preclude any recovery by the Robinsons from Crown Cork. The
Legislature, concerned about the financial toll of asbestos suits, limited
the liability of corporations that (1) had purchased companies
manufacturing asbestos, but (2) did not continue in the asbestos
business. By making the
legislation effective immediately, the Legislature affected the
Robinsons=
suit. Crown Cork moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the legislation exempted it from paying any
damages to the Robinsons because the damages it had already paid to other
plaintiffs exceeded the monetary cap contained in the legislation. The trial court agreed and granted
summary judgment in favor of Crown Cork. Mrs.
Robinson[1]
attacks the summary judgment on three grounds, two of which are
constitutional in nature.
First, Mrs. Robinson claims that the legislation is
unconstitutionally retroactive as applied to her because it extinguished a
vested right. Next, she
claims that the law is unconstitutional because it is a special law,
designed specifically to aid Crown Cork. Finally, she claims that Crown
Cork failed to establish as a matter of law each element of its
affirmative defense. As to Mrs.
Robinson=s first
issue, we agree that the legislation acted retroactively upon her
claims. But we do not
conclude that the legislation is unconstitutionally retroactive as applied
to Mrs. Robinson because it was a Avalid
exercise of the police power by the Legislature to safeguard the public
safety and welfare . . . .@ Barshop v. Medina County
Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 633B34 (Tex.
1996). Regarding
Mrs. Robinson=s second
constitutional claimCthat the
statute is unconstitutional because it is a special lawCwe
conclude the statute is not a special law. Clearly it was drafted to include
Crown Cork within its scope, but it was not written to exclude companies
similarly situated to Crown Cork.
And, because it operates on a subject in which the public at large
is interested, it affects all of the citizens of the State.
Finally,
we hold that Crown Cork proved the elements of its affirmative defense as
a matter of law.
Consequently, we affirm the trial court=s
judgment. We explain
below. Factual
Background John
Robinson joined the United States Navy in 1956, and served for
approximately twenty years as a boiler tender on several Navy
vessels. Mr. Robinson
maintained boilers, pipes, steam lines, and other machinery and equipment
insulated with asbestos products, including insulation products of Mundet
Cork Corporation. Crown Cork
is a manufacturer and distributor of packaging products for consumer
goods. In 1963, Crown Cork,
then a New York corporation, was the nation=s largest
producer and seller of metal bottle caps, known in the industry as
Acrowns.@ Mundet also produced and sold
crowns. Seeking to acquire
the assets of Mundet=s
competing bottle cap division, in November of 1963, Crown Cork purchased
the majority of Mundet stock.
Approximately three months later, Mundet sold its insulation
division.[2] Crown Cork continued to purchase
Mundet stock until February of 1966, when the remaining assets of Mundet
were transferred to Crown Cork by merger. In 1989, Crown Cork merged into a
new Pennsylvania corporation of the same name. Years
later, John Robinson was diagnosed with mesothelioma. He and his wife, Barbara, sued
Crown Cork, Mundet=s
successor, and others for damages caused by Mr. Robinson=s exposure
to asbestos. The Robinsons
moved for partial summary judgment to establish Crown Cork=s
liability for the damages allegedly caused by Mundet=s
products. Crown Cork did not
contest its liability for compensatory damages. The trial court granted the
Robinsons= motion as
to compensatory damages, but not as to punitive damages.
While the
Robinsons= suit was
pending, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 4; House Bill 4 included
a new affirmative defense limiting the liability of successor corporations
for asbestos-related claims.
See Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, 2003 Tex.
Gen. Laws 847. Section 17 of
House Bill 4 directly impacted the Robinsons=
suit. That section provides
that certain successor corporations of asbestos manufacturers may limit
their total asbestos liability to the total gross asset value of the
predecessor company at the time of the merger or consolidation. Id. '
17.01. The only section of
House Bill 4 made immediately effective upon its passage by two-thirds of
each house of the Legislature was Section 17; it became effective on June
11, 2003. See Act of
June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, ' 23.02(b),
2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 898, 899.
In addition, the only section made retroactive to all cases pending
on its effective date was, again, Section 17. See Act of June 2, 2003,
78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, ' 17.02(2),
2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 895.
Section 17 is codified at Chapter 149 of the Texas Civil Practice
& Remedies Code, entitled ALimitations
in Civil Actions of Liabilities Relating to Certain Mergers or
Consolidations.@ See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. ''
149.001B.006. Throughout the remainder of the
opinion we will refer to Section 17 as Athe
Statute.@ The stated
purpose of the Statute is to limit cumulative Asuccessor
asbestos-related liabilities@[3] in
Texas. A successor
corporation is liable for asbestos claims[4]
only up to the total gross assets of the transferor corporation from whom
it received the asbestos-related liabilities; total gross assets are
determined as of the time of the merger or consolidation. See id. '
149.003(a); see also id. ''
149.001(4) (defining Asuccessor@ as
Aa
corporation that assumes or incurs, or has assumed or incurred, successor
asbestos-related liabilities@);
149.001(5) (defining Atransferor@ as
Aa
corporation from which successor asbestos-related liabilities are or were
assumed or incurred@).[5] A successor corporation is not
responsible for successor asbestos-related liabilities that exceed this
limitation. Id.
'
149.003(a). Additionally, the
Statute provides that, if a transferor corporation had assumed or incurred
successor asbestos-related liabilities from a prior merger or
consolidation with a transferor, then the fair market value of the total
assets of the first transferor shall be used to determine the successor
corporation=s
liability. Id.
'
149.003(b). To the fullest
extent permissible, Texas law applies to successor asbestos-related
liabilities. See id.
' 149.006
(AThe courts
in this state shall apply, to the fullest extent permissible under the
United States Constitution, this state=s
substantive law, including the limitation under this chapter, to the issue
of successor asbestos‑related liabilities.@). As noted
previously, after the Statute became effective, Crown Cork moved for
summary judgment. Crown Cork
argued that it had already paid successor asbestos claims in excess of
Mundet=s total
gross assets, and therefore, it had no further liability in any asbestos
case.[6] The trial court granted the motion
and severed the Robinsons= claims
against Crown Cork from those against the other defendants. This appeal
followed. Robinson=s
Issues On appeal,
Mrs. Robinson raises three issues, contending the trial court erred in
granting Crown Cork=s motion
for summary judgment because (1) the Statute violates the Texas
Constitution=s
prohibition on retroactive laws, (2) the Statute violates the Texas
Constitution=s
prohibition on special laws, and (3) Crown Cork failed to establish as a
matter of law each element of the Statute. I.
The Statute Does Not Violate the Texas
Constitution=s
Prohibition on Retroactive Laws. In her
first issue, Mrs. Robinson contends the Statute violates Article I,
section 16 of the Texas Constitution. That section provides as
follows: ANo bill of
attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the
obligation of contracts, shall be made.@ Tex. Const. art I, ' 16. Mrs. Robinson does not contend
section 16 bans all retroactive laws. Instead, she argues vested
rights cannot be extinguished retroactively; she maintains that an
accrued cause of action is a vested right and thus not retroactively
extinguishable. She asserts
that her accrued tort claims were vested before the Statute became
effective and therefore could not be extinguished by subsequently enacted
legislation. Yet, she argues,
the Statute completely eliminated the accrued tort claims against Crown
Cork in contravention of section 16.[7]
We do not
find the law on vested rights to be as consistent and lucid as Mrs.
Robinson claims. For this
reason, as we explain below, we choose not to employ a vested-rights
analysis to assess the Statute=s
constitutionality. Instead,
we conclude that we may look to the police power of the Legislature to
find authority for the Statute=s
enactment and for its validationCin spite
of its retroactivity. The
Legislature may exercise its police power to balance competing individual
and societal interests and to enact legislation that reasonably responds
to the issues and interests before it. That power and responsibility goes
to the very essence of the Legislature=s role in
our tripartite democratic system. A. The Case
Law on Vested Rights is Inconsistent and Difficult to Use as a
Guide. Courts
have struggled for years to settle upon a reliable method for judging the
constitutionality of a retroactive statute. Many Texas courts and courts of
other states have used the designation Avested
right@ to
describe a right that cannot be abrogated by a retroactive law. See, e.g.,
Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light, 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556, 560
(1916); Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 3 S.W. 249, 253
(1887); Phillips v. Curiale, 608 A.2d 895, 901B02 (N.J.
1992); Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 173 N.W.2d 353,
356B358 (Minn.
1969); see also Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696 (1960);
Ray H. Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil
Legislation, 51 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 540, 561B62
(1956). But a problem arises
when one tries to define a vested right. Some Texas cases arguably have
used language implying that an accrued cause of action is a vested
right. See Mellinger,
3 S.W. at 253 (AWhen . . .
a state of facts exists as the law declares shall entitle a plaintiff
relief in a court of justice on a claim which he makes against another . .
., then it must be said that a right exists, has become fixed or vested,
and is beyond the reach of retroactive legislation . . . .@); but
see Ex Parte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255, 261 (Tex. 1981) (A[A] right
cannot be considered a vested right unless it is something more than such
a mere expectation as may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the
present general laws; it must have become a title, legal or equitable to
the present or future enjoyment of a demand or a legal exemption from the
demand made by another.@). Other cases have held that a right
is not vested until a final judgment is entered. See Walls v. First State Bank
of Miami, 900 S.W.2d 117, 122 (Tex. App.CAmarillo
1995, writ denied) (stating that Aonly
final, nonreviewable judgments will be accorded the dignity of vested,
constitutionally guarded rights . . . .@);
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 798 S.W.2d
580, 589 (Tex. App.CHouston
[1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (stating that Athe
triggering event for the vesting of a right is the resolution of the
controversy and the final determination . . . .@). Thus, our
predicament in answering the precise question Mrs. Robinson has
raisedCwhether
her allegedly vested right was retroactively altered in an
unconstitutional wayCis
this: no clear answer
exists. For example, Mrs.
Robinson declares that her tort claims were vested rights because the set
of facts underlying her cause of action had already occurred. This long has been a way of
describing vested rights.
See Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 253B54. But even this designation is
subject to variances in application, as the following quote, written more
than seventy-five years ago, illustrates: One=s first
impulse on undertaking to discuss retroactive laws and vested rights is to
define a vested right. But
when it appears, as soon happens, that this is impossible, one decides to
fix the attention upon retroactive laws and leave the matter of definition
to follow rather than precede the discussion, assuming for the purpose
that a right is vested when it is immune to destruction, and that it is
not vested when it is liable to destruction, by retroactive
legislation. The
simplification of the task which this plan seems to involve, turns out to
be something of an illusion, however, when it appears, as also soon
happens, that one=s
preconceived notions of retroactive laws are irreconcilable with the data
with which one has to deal. Bryant
Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 231, 231 (1927)
(footnote omitted).
Apparently, the job of ascertaining when a right is vested, and
when it is not, has vexed courts and commentators for
years. B. Some Courts
Have Looked to Alternative Methods to Assess When a Statute is
Unconstitutionally Retroactive. Courts in
other states also have recognized the dilemma they confront when an
allegedly vested right is pitted against a retroactive law: A[D]iscerning
commentators and judges@ have
questioned the value of vested-rights analysis and have suggested that
Athe true
test of the constitutionality of a retrospective law is whether a party
has changed his [or her] position in reliance upon the existing law, or
whether the retrospective act gives effect to or defeats the reasonable
expectations of the parties.@ Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme
Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696 (1960)
(Hochman) (footnotes omitted).
Although agreeing that the parties=
reasonable expectations may be relevant, Hochman has argued that the
constitutionality of a retroactive statute is in fact determined by courts
through a weighing of the following factors: (1) the nature and strength
of the public interest served by the statute, (2) the extent to which the
statute modifies or abrogates the asserted right, and (3) the nature of
the right that the statute alters.
Id. at 697. In
Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974), we applied a
similar test to determine whether a retroactively‑applied statute
constituted a deprivation of due process. We said in Rothman that
that analysis essentially involves asking whether, after examining the
importance of the public interest served by the statute and comparing it
with and balancing it against the quality and value of the right affected
by the retroactive legislation, [one could conclude] that the statute in
question represented a valid exercise of police power, despite the * * *
clear incursion upon individual private rights. [Id. at 226, 320
A.2d 496.] See also
Berkley Condominium Ass=n v.
Berkley Condominium Residences, Inc., 185 N.J.
Super. 313, 320, 448 A.2d 510 (Ch. Div.1982) (when determining what rights
may become vested, Aone must
examine what it is that is being taken away and weigh that loss against
the social gain being achieved@). Phillips, 608 A.2d
at 902; see also Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assoc., 772 A.2d
368, 379B83 (N.J.
2001) (noting that New Jersey courts have had difficulty clearly defining
Avested
right@ and
choosing to use a Arational
basis@ inquiry
rather than a Avested
rights@
inquiry). The Texas
Supreme Court also has acknowledged the quandary. See Texas Water Rights
Comm=n v.
Wright, 464
S.W.2d 642, 648B49 (Tex.
1971). Justice Pope, speaking
for the Court, acknowledged the confusion in the case law, noting that
A[a] number
of scholars have endeavored to discover the underlying rationale for the
cases which either uphold or strike down a statute which is attacked as
unconstitutionally retroactive.@ Id. at 649. Justice Pope then briefly
discussed several alternative methods commentators have relied on to
determine if a law was unconstitutionally retroactive.[8]
Id.
In light
of the inconsistency surrounding vested rights and the apparent difficulty
in determining if a right is vested, we will follow Justice
Pope=s lead and
use a gauge other than vested rights to measure the Statute=s
constitutionality.
C. The
Legislature=s Police
Power to Enact Retroactive Laws. Facing
claims that a statute unconstitutionally abrogated allegedly vested
rights, a number of older Texas court of appeals opinions have resolved
the issue by considering the Legislature=s police
power. See, e.g., Texas
State Teachers Ass=n v.
State, 711
S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. App.CAustin
1986, writ ref=d n.r.e.);
Ismail v. Ismail, 702 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex. App.CHouston
[1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref=d n.r.e.);
State Bd. of Registration for Prof=l
Eng=rs v.
Wichita Eng=g
Co., 504
S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.CFort Worth
1973, writ ref=d n.r.e.);
City of Breckenridge v. Cozart, 478 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. Civ.
App.CEastland
1972, writ ref=d n.r.e.);
City of Coleman v. Rhone, 222 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. Civ.
App.CEastland
1949, writ ref=d.). The Texas Supreme Court also has
done this, most recently relying on the police power to validate a
retroactive statute in Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water
Conservation District, 925 S.W.2d 618, 633B34 (Tex.
1996). Barshop gives
scant guidance on how to measure the legitimacy of an act of police power
against a private right.
Fortunately, a number of the courts of appeals considering the
issue have written rather extensively on the balancing of rights they have
performed when comparing a statute with the private right that is being
altered. After looking
generally at the scope of the police power, we will then follow the lead
of these courts by considering the reasons the legislature enacted the
Statute, including precautions taken to narrow the scope of the
Statute=s
reach. Then, we will measure
those legislative justifications against the private rights the Statute
impacts. 1.
The Legislature=s Police
Power. Although
Mrs. Robinson strenuously argues that we cannot rely on the police power
to validate the Statute, we disagree. In fact, we are of the opinion
that the enactment of the Statute was a reasonable exercise of the
Legislature=s police
power. Many
courts have spoken to the breadth of the police power. Though not unfettered, it is
Abroad and
comprehensive.@ Rhone, 222 S.W.2d at
648. AIt is
founded upon public necessity which alone can justify its
exercise@ and
Ahinges
upon the public need for safety, health, security, and protection of the
general welfare of the community.@ Id. When a statute is attacked as violating the retroactivity clause, the language of the clause must be balanced against the state=s interest in exercising its police power. See Texas State Teachers Ass=n v. State, 711 S.W.2d at 425. AAlthough the language of the [retroactivity] clause is facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the state | |