Send this document to a
colleague |
Close
This Window |
|
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 13,
2006. In
The Fourteenth
Court of Appeals _______________ NO. 14-04-00714-CV _______________ JESSICA FORDE,
Appellant V. EDWIN GEOVANI MARTINEZ, Appellee
On Appeal from 300th
District Court Brazoria County,
Texas Trial Court Cause No. 18996*RH02
M E M O R
A N D U M O P I N I O
N Jessica Forde appeals an order
denying her recovery of retroactive child support (the Asupport@) from the child=s father, Edwin Geovani
Martinez, on the grounds that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion
in denying the support; (2) the child=s constitutional right to equal
protection was violated by this denial; (3) the statutory scheme to
determine retroactive support is unconstitutional; and (4) the guardian ad litem provided
ineffective assistance. We
affirm. Forde=s first and second issues
contend that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the support
because it failed to follow the guidelines listed in the Family Code and
instead based its ruling on: (1) a theory of Aquid pro quo,@ meaning that because it
awarded no back visitation to Martinez, it would award no back support to
Forde; (2) the lack of pleadings requesting the support, even though the
issue was tried by consent; and (3) findings of fact that are unsupported
by any evidence.
Additionally, Forde argues that the denial of the support was
arbitrary and unreasonable in the face of Martinez=s admission that he had not
provided child support for his child while they were separated and his
statement that he had no reason to disagree with Forde=s calculations as to the total
amount of back child support
owed. A trial court=s denial of retroactive child
support is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Guthrie, 45 S.W.3d
719, 727 (Tex. App.CDallas 2001, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its
discretion if, among other things, it fails to adhere to guiding rules and
principles. See Cire v.
Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838-39 (Tex. 2004). A trial court does not abuse its
discretion if some evidence reasonably supports its decision. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co.,
84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002). A parent who fails to discharge
the duty of support is liable to a person who provides necessaries to
those to whom support is owed.
Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
' 151.001(c) (Vernon Supp.
2005). A court may order a
parent to pay retroactive child support if the parent: (1) has not
previously been ordered to pay support for the child; and (2) was not a
party to a suit in which support was ordered. Id. ' 154.009(a) (Vernon 2002). In ordering retroactive child
support, the court shall apply the guidelines provided by chapter 154 of
the Family Code. Id.
' 154.009(b). Chapter 154 provides the following
guidelines for awarding retroactive child support: (a) The child support guidelines are intended to
guide the court in determining the amount of retroactive child support, if
any, to be ordered. (b) In ordering retroactive child support, the
court shall consider the net resources of the obligor during the relevant
time period and whether: (1) the mother of the child had made any previous
attempts to notify the obligor of his paternity or probable
paternity; (2) the obligor had knowledge of his paternity or
probable paternity; (3) the order of retroactive child support will
impose an undue financial hardship on the obligor or the
obligor=s family; and (4) the obligor has provided actual support or
other necessaries before the filing of the action. Id. ' 154.131 (Vernon 2002).[1] In this case, the trial court
entered the following finding of fact and conclusion of law, respectively,
regarding the support: Findings of Fact - Child Support *** 17.
No retroactive child support should be ordered because Petitioner
and Petitioner=s family have provided actual support or other
necessities for the child before the filing of this suit and an order for
retroactive child support would impose an undue financial hardship on the
Petitioner. *** Conclusions of Law *** 7. No
retroactive child support shall be ordered since there are no pleadings on
file from Respondent seeking such relief. Even assuming the issue of
retroactive child support was tried by consent, as Forde contends, the
finding of fact reflects that the trial court based its decision on the
factors set forth in the Family Code for awarding retroactive support,
particularly whether an order of retroactive support would impose an undue
financial hardship on Martinez or his family; and whether Martinez
provided any actual support or other necessaries before the filing of the
suit. See id.
'' 154.009(b), 154.131(b)(3),
(4). The evidence also
showed: (1)
Martinez=s gross monthly income and
approximate gross income during the period at issue; (2) that Martinez
currently provides support to two other children in addition to the
support he provides to his child with Forde; (3) that Martinez=s mother had provided daycare
several times a week until the child was approximately two years old; and
(4) that Forde had received from $500 to $1000 from Martinez for the
child=s care during the time after
she and Martinez separated until the Rule 11 agreement was signed
providing for temporary support on August 29, 2002. Because the trial court thus acted
in reference to guiding rules and principles in denying the support and
some evidence reasonably supports its decision, Forde=s first and second issues fail
to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion and are
overruled. Forde=s third issue argues that
denial of the support deprived the child of equal protection under the law
and that the statutory scheme to determine retroactive support is
unconstitutional.[2] However, because Forde did not
present either of these complaints to the trial court in any manner, this
issue presents nothing for our review[3]
and is overruled. Forde=s fourth issue contends that
the child did not receive effective assistance of the guardian ad
litem. However, Forde does
not cite, and we have not found, any authority even addressing effective
assistance of a guardian ad litem, let alone establishing any remedies for
a failure to provide it or indicating how it might bear on a claim for
retroactive child support.[4] Therefore, Forde=s fourth issue affords no basis
for relief and is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed. /s/
Richard H. Edelman Justice Judgment rendered and
Memorandum Opinion filed April 13, 2006. Panel consists of Justices
Edelman, Guzman, and Murphy.[5] [1]
Forde has cited no case in which a denial of retroactive child
support has been found an abuse of discretion. [2]
In support of this contention, Forde cites Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973). However, the constitutional problem addressed in
Gomez was the denial of a child=s essential right to support from his or her
natural father based exclusively on the child=s illegitimate status. Id. at 539. That constitutional problem is not
present in this case because, as discussed above, the denial of the
support was based on the factors listed in chapter 154 of the Family Code,
not on the child=s illegitimate status. These factors are
applicable in determining whether to award retroactive child support
regardless of the marital status of the parents. See Knight v. Knight, 131
S.W.3d 535 (Tex. App.CEl Paso 2004, no pet.); Nordstrom v.
Nordstrom, 965 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied). Therefore, Gomez does not
support an equal protection challenge in this
case. [3]
See Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a). [4]
In addition, Forde presented this issue to the trial court for the
first time in her motion for new trial. [5]
Senior Chief Justice Paul C. Murphy sitting by
assignment. | |