Grandparent Visitation: Texas Supreme Court Denies Access Based on USCT Precedent
In re Karen Mays-Hooper No. 04-1030 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proc.) (per curiam) (mandamus granted) [grandparent access to children, natural parent preference, presumption favoring parents over non-parents) IN RE KAREN MAYS-HOOPER; from Tarrant County; 2nd district (02-04-00321-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 10/15/ 04) as reinstated stay order issued November 19, 2004, lifted Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c), without hearing oral argument, the Court conditionally grants the petition for writ of mandamus. Per Curiam Opinion (Justice Willett not sitting) (“Without hearing oral argument, Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(c), ("We conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the trial court to vacate its order of September 21, 2004 granting grandparent possession.“) See U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) Also see OP. TEX. ATT'Y GEN, No. GA-0260 ("a Court must require a grandparent to "overcome the presumption that a fit parent acts in the best interest of his or her child"")
Supreme Court Finds No Economic Duress in Alimony Agreement
Sudan v. Sudan, No. 04-0921 (Tex. June 30, 2006)(per curiam) [divorce agreement, alimony, spousal support, no economic duress] 04-0921 PHILIP P. SUDAN, JR. v. MARGARET DYE SUDAN, NOW KNOWN AS MAGGIE MACKENZIE; from Harris County; 14th district (14 01 00854 CV, 145 SW3d 280, 06 17 04) 2 petitions Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petitions for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment. ("In this suit to enforce a settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree, we consider whether there is any evidence that the ex-wife was coerced into relinquishing her rights to future alimony payments. The court of appeals reversed a summary judgment in favor of the ex-husband, concluding there was some evidence that the ex-wife was under economic duress when she gave up her rights. 145 S.W.3d 280, 288. We disagree that there is evidence of economic duress here and accordingly render judgment for the ex-husband.")
Texas Supreme Court Dismisses Appeal of Order Setting Aside a False Prior Paternity Adjudication in a Divorce Decree Because Bill-of-Review Summary Judgment Did Not Adjudicate Biological Paternity and Was Thus Not a Final Appealable Judgment
Kiefer v. Touris, No. 05-0651 (Tex. May 26, 2006) [Bill of review, set aside prior determination of paternity, nonpaternity; wife had child with another man while married, subsequent divorce decree adjudicated child as child of the marriage, trial court granted biological father’s bill of review by summary judgment, set aside the parentage adjudication in the divorce decree, but did not enter a new adjudication of child’s parentage] 05-0651 TERRY KIEFER AND KELLY JO WOOD v. IOANNIS JOHN TOURIS AND DENNIS G. BREWER, JR. EX REL. A.K., A MINOR; from Dallas County; 10th district (10-03-00331-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 06-29-05) 2 petitions Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petitions for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and dismisses the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Per Curiam Opinion (“In this case we consider whether a judgment in a bill of review proceeding that sets aside a parentage adjudication, but does not make a new parentage adjudication, is an appealable judgment. We conclude that it is not. “)(Mother had affair resulting in birth of child while married, then divorced; bio dad filed suit to establish his paternity)
Texas Supreme Court Rules on Child Support Consequences of Informal Custody Switch
In re A.M and B.M. No. 03-0509 (Tex. May 5, 2006) [custody switch and child support off-set and reimbursement claims, either-or or both, actual support, presumption or what proof required?] 03-0509 IN THE INTEREST OF A.M. AND B.M., CHILDREN; from Harris County; 13th district (13 00 00649 CV, 101 S.W.3d 480, 07-18-02) 2 petitions The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court. Justice Medina delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice O'Neill, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice Green, and Justice Willett
From the opinion: In this case, we must decide under what circumstances a parent, who has been ordered to pay periodic child support, may raise the affirmative defense of Texas Family Code section 157.008 to a suit to collect that support. The statute provides that an obligor parent, who by agreement has possessed a child for periods exceeding court-ordered possession, and who has provided actual support for the child during such period, “may request reimbursement for that support as a counterclaim or offset against the claim of the obligee [parent].” Tex. Fam. Code § 157.008(d). The court of appeals concluded that this statute provided the obligor both an offset and an affirmative right to reimbursement for periodic child support payments during a period of excess possession, that the obligor did not have to provide an accounting of expenses to receive this relief, and that the Attorney General, as assignee of the obligee parent’s right to enforce the child support order, could litigate offsets, but could not defend against an affirmative claim for reimbursement from the obligee. 101 S.W.3d 480. Because we disagree that section 157.008 permits the obligor to obtain both an offset and affirmative reimbursement for the same periodic payment, and further disagree that the Attorney General lacks standing to litigate any part of the defense provided by this statute, we reverse.
Justice Johnson delivered a concurring and dissenting opinion: I agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that the absence of evidence that Chism or anyone other than Mullen provided support for the children during the time that Mullen had possession of them would allow an inference that Mullen provided some level of actual support for that period of time. ... I do not agree, as the majority concludes, that the inference of some support allows a second inference, labeled as a presumption, that Mullen provided actual support in the specific amount of his monthly child support obligation. Mullen was statutorily obligated to prove the amount of support he provided in order to receive an offset or reimbursement. In my view, Mullen is entitled to offset only the amount of actual support he proved and the trial court found, subject to proper appellate review and limited as provided by statute.”)