2006 Texas Supreme Court Opinions By Justice Harriet O'Neill
2006 Cases with Dissents and Concurrences by Justice O'Neill
Meyer v. WMCI-GP, No. 04-0252 (Tex. Dec. 22, 2006)(Justice Hecht) [arbitration law, compel arbitration, nonparty, right of first refusal, assignment, equitable estoppel] 04-0252 ALTON J. MEYER, MEYER ACQUISITION CORP., AND FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. WMCO-GP, LLC AND BULLOCK MOTOR COMPANY; from Angelina County; 9th district (09-03-00255-CV, 126 S.W.3d 313, 01 15 04 2 petitions The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court. Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice Medina, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice Willett Justice O'Neill delivered a dissenting opinion
Tony Gullo Motors I v. Chapa, No. 04-0961 (Tex. Dec. 22, 2006)(Justice Brister) [consumer law, auto purchase, DTPA, election of remedies, constitutionality of exemplary damages, damages cap] 04-0961 TONY GULLO MOTORS I, L.P. AND BRIEN GARCIA v. NURY CHAPA; from Montgomery County; 9th district (09 03 00568 CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 08 26 04) 2 petitions The Court remands to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Justice Brister delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice Green, and Justice Willett Justice Johnson delivered a concurring opinion Justice O'Neill delivered a dissenting opinion Nury Chapa’s allegations describe what amounts to a bait-and-switch by Gullo Motors, a claim the jury and this Court agree there is evidence to support. The evidence shows that, in furtherance of that scheme, Chapa was threatened, lied to, and her signature and that of her deceased husband were forged. The defendant’s conduct in this case was at best reprehensible, and bordered on criminal, prompting the jury to award $250,000 in exemplary damages. Texas law capped that award at $200,000, and the court of appeals further reduced it by remittitur to $125,000. Even though the remitted award is well below the statutory ceiling that the Legislature set, the Court today decides the appeals court award is exorbitant and cannot stand. I do not agree that the court of appeals violated constitutional exorbitancy standards by suggesting the remittitur that it did, nor do I agree with the Court’s advisory determination of the attorney’s fee issue. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Brookshire Grocery Co. v. Taylor, No. 03-0408 (Tex. Dec. 1, 2006)(Justice Nathan Hecht) [personal injury law, premises liability claim, slip and fall, negligence] BROOKSHIRE GROCERY COMPANY, D/B/A BROOKSHIRE FOOD STORES v. MARY FRANCIS TAYLOR; from Lamar County; 6th district (06 02 00122 CV, 102 S.W.3d 816, 04-01-03) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment. Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice Willett Justice Johnson delivered a concurring opinion Justice O'Neill delivered a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Medina
In Re CPS No. 04-1043 (Tex. Dec. 15, 2006)(Justice Wainwright) [family law, termination of parental rights, appeal, mandamus, dismissal] 04-1043 IN RE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES; from Travis County; 3rd district (03-04-00464-CV, 03-04-00466-CV, 150 SW3d 819, 10-21-04) motion for rehearing denied. The Court withdraws its opinion issued September 22, 2006, and issues a substituted opinion. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c), without hearing oral argument, the Court conditionally grants the petition for writ of mandamus. Justice Wainwright delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice Brister, Justice Medina, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice Willett (“we conclude that the court of appeals erred in granting Ludwig’s and Higdon’s petitions for writ of mandamus. We conditionally grant the Department’s petition for writ of mandamus because Higdon and Ludwig had an adequate remedy by appeal. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c) and without hearing oral argument, we direct the court of appeals to vacate its order to the trial court directing the trial court to dismiss the case. The writ will issue only if the court of appeals does not comply.”) Justice O'Neill delivered a dissenting opinion http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/2006/dec/041043d.htm First, as the Court acknowledges, we have regularly granted mandamus relief in cases affecting child custody. See, e.g., Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. 2005); In re Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d 373, 379 (Tex. 2004). Child-custody proceedings touch on constitutional interests of parents and critical issues affecting children’s welfare. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003). In this sensitive context, we have afforded mandamus review even though an appeal may have been available. Geary v. Peavy, 878 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Tex. 1994).
I agree with the Court that mandamus is generally not available to a party that has an adequate remedy by appeal. But we have said that the concept of “adequacy” is not inexorably fixed, and “rigid rules are necessarily inconsistent with the flexibility that is the remedy’s principal virtue.” In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). In recent years, we have allowed mandamus review to protect interests of far less consequence than those at stake in this case. We have, for example, granted mandamus relief to a party wrongfully denied arbitration, Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992); a party seeking to enforce a forum-selection clause, In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 2004); a party seeking relief from overbroad discovery orders, In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. 2003); a party seeking to enforce a pre-trial jury waiver, In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124; and a party denied a legislative continuance under § 30.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tex. 2005). Yet when a child lingers in foster care while the legal process determines whether the parental relationship will be forever severed, the Court decides that an adequate appellate remedy precludes mandamus review. Under the circumstances this case presents, I disagree.
City of Marshall v. City of Uncertain No. 03-1111 (Tex. June 9, 2006)(Opinion by Justice O'Neill) [water dispute] 03-1111 CITY OF MARSHALL AND TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY v. CITY OF UNCERTAIN, CADDO LAKE AREA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND TOURISM, GREATER CADDO LAKE ASSOCIATION, CADDO LAKE INSTITUTE, JOHN T. ECHOLS AND BARRY L. BENNICK; from Travis County; 3rd district (03 03 00154 CV, 124 SW3d 690, 10 16 03) 2 petitions The Court affirms in part the court of appeals' judgment and remands to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. Justice O'Neill delivered the opinion of the Court
Majority Opinions by Justice Harriet O'Neill
Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consolidated ISD v. Texas Political Subdivision Self-Insurance Fund, No. 05-0340 (Tex. Dec. 29, 2006)(Justice O’Neill) [ISD cases, sovereign immunity, new statutory waiver applies] BEN BOLT-PALITO BLANCO CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT v. TEXAS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS PROPERTY/CASUALTY JOINT SELF-INSURANCE FUND; from Jim Wells County; 4th district (04 04 00658 CV, 163 SW3d 172, 03 09 05)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court. Justice O'Neill delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice Medina, and Justice Johnson
Because Section 271.152 of the Local Government Code waives the Fund’’s immunity from Ben Bolt’’s claim arising out of the insurance agreement between the parties, we reverse the court of appeals’’ judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Hallco Texas v. McMullen County (Tex. Dec. 29, 2006)(Justice O'Neill) [government entity law, takings claim, res judicata] 02 1176 HALLCO TEXAS, INC. v. MCMULLEN COUNTY; from McMullen County; 4th district (04 02 00164 CV, 94 SW3d 735, 11 20 02) The Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment. Justice O'Neill delivered the opinion of the Court as to Parts I, II, III.B, and V, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, and Justice Johnson, and an opinion as to Part III.A and IV, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Brister, and Justice Johnson
Justice Hecht delivered a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Medina and Justice Willett Hallco is entitled to a decision on the merits of its claims that the County’s ordinance effected a compensable taking of its property. Because the Court disagrees, I respectfully dissent. (Justice Green not sitting)
Supreme Court Overturns Rulings Favorable to Houston Firefighter in Two Prior Appeals
City of Houston v. Jackson No. 04-045 (Tex. April 7, 2006) (Justice Harriet O'Neill) [fire fighter employment grievance, penalty, plea to the jurisdiction, two appeals in the court of appeals below, law of case doctrine does not preclude Texas Supreme Court from reviewing issue in first, interlocutory appeal] 04-0465 THE CITY OF HOUSTON v. ROBERT JACKSON; from Harris County; 1st district (01 02 00879 CV, 135 S. W.3d 891, 04 01 04) unopposed motion for leave to file post submission brief granted The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and dismisses respondent's statutory penalty claim for want of jurisdiction. Justice O'Neill delivered the opinion of the Court (“Section 143.134(h) of the Texas Local Government Code imposes a $1,000 penalty payable to an aggrieved fire fighter for each day a department head intentionally fails to implement a decision of the Fire Fighters’ and Police Officers’ Civil Service Commission (the “Commission”) under Section 143.131 or a decision of a hearing examiner under Section 143.129 that has become final. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Section 143.134(h). The court of appeals held that the penalty provision also applies to a grievance examiner’s unappealed recommendation under Section 143.130 of the Code. 135 S.W.3d 891. We hold that, by the provision’s plain language, it does not. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and dismiss Jackson’s statutory penalty claim for want of jurisdiction.”)
GTE Mobilenet of Houston, Inc. v. The Chair King No. 04-0570 (Tex. Feb. 3, 2006)(Opinion by Justice O'Neill) "We conclude that, because Texas did not otherwise permit a cause of action for the receipt of unsolicited fax advertisements until September 1, 1999, and the faxes at issue in this case were sent before that date, plaintiffs have no actionable claim. Because this conclusion is dispositive, we do not reach the parties’ other arguments involving the limitations period applicable to TCPA claims and the application of Texas agency law under the facts presented here. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment in favor of GTE Mobilnet." Opinion by Justice Harriet O’Neill