Terk v. Oppenheimer No. 04-0681(Tex. May 4, 2006)(Justice Wallace Jefferson) [attorney malpractice, who can sue on behalf of estate?] KRISTIN TERK BELT AND KIMBERLY TERK MURPHY, JOINT INDEPENDENT EXECUTRIXES OF THE ESTATE OF DAVID B. TERK, DECEASED v. OPPENHEIMER, BLEND, HARRISON & TATE, INC., GLEN A. YALE, J. DAVID OPPENHEIMER AND KENNETH M. GINDY; from Bexar County; 4th district (04-03-00832-CV, 141 S.W.3d 706, 06/16/ 04) The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court. Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court (Justice Green not sitting) ("In accordance with the long-standing, common-law principle that actions for damage to property survive the death of the injured party, we hold that legal malpractice claims alleging pure economic loss survive in favor of a deceased client’s estate, because such claims are necessarily limited to recovery for property damage...The Terks—in their capacity as personal representatives of their father’s estate—may maintain an estate-planning malpractice claim against the Attorneys. We therefore reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 60.2(d).
Brittingham-Sada de Ayala v. Mackie No. 04-0160 (Tex. April 21, 2006)(Justice Wallace B. Jefferson) [interlocutory appeals statute, probate proceeding, permissive interlocutory appeal] MARIA CRISTINA BRITTINGHAM-SADA DE AYALA v. KEVIN MICHAEL MACKIE, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ANCILLARY ESTATE OF JUAN ROBERTO BRITTINGHAM-MCLEAN, DECEASED; from Webb County; 4th district (04 01 00204 CV, 131 S.W.3d 3, 07 02 03) The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and dismisses the appeal. Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court (Justice O'Neill and Justice Green not sitting)
City of White Settlement, Texas v. Superwash, Inc. No. 04-0340 (Texas, March 2, 2006)(Justice Jefferson) from Tarrant County; 2nd district (02 -03 -00089 -CV, 131 S.W.3d. 249, 02/26/04) The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment in part and renders judgment. Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court
Separate Opinions by Justice Jefferson (Dissents and Concurrences)
Sheshunoff Mgmt Serv's v. Johnson, Strunk & Assoc. (Tex. Oct 20, 2006)(concurrence by Chief Jefferson) The Court’s holding permits an employer to enforce a non-compete covenant months or even years after the employee signed it, as long as the employer eventually fulfills its side of the bargain. That sort of delay is inconsistent with clear statutory language that the covenant must be enforceable “at the time the agreement is made.” While I agree with the Court that “at the time” does not require an instantaneous exchange of consideration, neither does the statute permit the employer’s promise to hang in the air, indefinitely, until it “becomes enforceable” by performance. Rather, consistent with Light and with the statute, I would hold that the employer’s exchange of consideration must occur within a reasonable time after the agreement is made. Because that condition was satisfied on this record, I concur in the judgment.
December 2006 Majority Opinions Authored by Chief Justice Jefferson
Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., No. 04-0537 (Tex. Dec. 22, 2006)(Justice Jefferson) [Personal Injury Law, PI-Auto, underinsured motorist coverage UIM insurance, negligence, recovery of prejudgment interest, calculation of prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, presentment of claim] LILITH BRAINARD, ET AL. v. TRINITY UNIVERSAL INSURANCE CO.; from Gray County; 7th district (07 03 00170 CV, 153 S.W.3d 508, 03/01/04) The Court reverses in part and affirms in part the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court. Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court (Justice O'Neill and Justice Johnson not sitting)
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Nickerson, No. 04-0427 (Tex. Dec. 22, 2006)(Justice Jefferson) STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. TERESA NICKERSON; from Lamar County; 6th district (06-03-00036-CV, 130 S.W.3d 487, 03/18/04) The Court reverses and renders in part the court of appeals' judgment and affirms in part the court of appeals' judgment. Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court (Justice O'Neill not sitting)
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Norris, No 04-0514 (Tex. Dec. 22, 2006)(Justice Jefferson) [Personal injury law, PI, auto, underinsured motorist insurance, UIM coverage, policy limits, prejudgment interest, calculation, settlement credit, attorney fees] STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. JIMMIE R. NORRIS; from Limestone County; 10th district (10-01-00370-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 04/14/04) The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment in part and remands in part. Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court (Justice O'Neill not sitting)
Earlier 2006 Opinions Written by Chief Justice Jefferson
In Re Hon. Castillo No. 06-0314 (Tex. 2006)(Justice Jefferson) IN RE THE HONORABLE ERRLINDA CASTILLO, JUSTICE, THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY as supplemented respondents' motion to dismiss without prejudice denied Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court
In re Lynd Company No. 05-0432 (Tex. June 9, 2006) (Justice Jefferson) [Rule 306a motion was properly granted by trial court, court of appeals opinion vacated, mandamus granted] IN RE THE LYND COMPANY; from Bexar County; 4th district (04 04 00751 CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 02/09/05). Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c), without hearing oral argument, the Court conditionally grants the petition for writ of mandamus. Opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Jefferson. (Justice Green not sitting) (“Because August 4, 2004 was more than twenty, but less than ninety-one, days after the default judgment was signed, and because Lynd timely filed its Rule 306a sworn motion and accompanying motion for new trial within thirty days of first receiving notice of the judgment, Rule 306a operated to extend the trial court’s plenary power to grant Lynd’s motion for new trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(4), (5); see also John, 58 S.W.3d at 741. Thus, pursuant to Rule 306a, August 4, 2004 served as the date from which all post-judgment deadlines and the trial court’s plenary power began to run. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(4) (date party received notice substitutes for the date judgment was signed as starting point from which post-judgment deadlines run). Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction on September 7, 2004 to issue its order granting Lynd’s motion for new trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b. Therefore, the court of appeals abused its discretion in ordering the trial court to vacate that order. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we conditionally grant Lynd’s petition for writ of mandamus, direct the court of appeals to vacate its ruling, and order the trial court to vacate its February 28, 2005 order withdrawing the September 7, 2004 order granting new trial. Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(c), (d).”)
No Waiver of Immunity in Traffic Signal Case
City of Grapevine v. Waddell No. 04-0933 (Tex., June 16, 2006)(Justice Jefferson) [TTCA, installation of traffic signal, no waiver of immunity] THE CITY OF GRAPEVINE, TEXAS v. AMY SIPES AND TANA (TREVINO) WADDELL; from Tarrant County; 2nd district (02 02 00323 CV, 146 S.W.3d 273, 08/31/04) The Court reverses in part the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment. Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court (“Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, a governmental unit retains immunity for claims based on the absence of a traffic signal unless the absence is not corrected by the governmental unit within a reasonable time after notice. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.060(a)(2). The trial court held that this provision immunized the City of Grapevine from liability based on its alleged negligence in failing to install a traffic signal within a reasonable time after initially deciding to do so. The court of appeals disagreed and reversed in part the trial court’s judgment. Because we conclude that “absence,” as used in subsection (a)(2), requires a prior presence, we reverse in part the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”)
Grocer Prevails in Suit Stemming from Shoplifting Charges
Kroger v. Suberu No. 03-0913 (Tex. May 5, 2006)(Justice Jefferson) KROGER TEXAS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND ROBERT MOODY v. THERESA SUBERU; from Dallas County; 5th district (05 02 00818 CV, 113 S.W3.d 588, 08/18/03) The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment. Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justice Hecht, Justice O'Neill, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice Green, and Justice Willett (“The evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding that Kroger lacked probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings against Suberu for shoplifting, and legally insufficient to support a finding that Kroger’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment that Suberu take nothing. See Tex. R. App. P. 60.2(c).”) Justice Johnson delivered a concurring and dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Medina, and by Justice Wainwright as to Part II I