Opinions by Justice Hecht (Tex. 2006)

Dissenting Opinion by Justice Hecht

Hallco Texas v. McMullen County
NO. 02-1176 (Tex. Dec. 29, 2006)(Justice O'Neill)
[takings claim, res judicata, claim preclusion]
02 1176 HALLCO TEXAS, INC. v. MCMULLEN COUNTY;
from McMullen County; 4th district (04 02 00164 CV,
94 SW3d 735, 11 20 02)
The Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment.
Justice O'Neill delivered the opinion of the Court as to Parts I, II, III.B,
and V, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright,
Justice Brister, and Justice Johnson, and an opinion as to Part III.A and IV,
joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Brister, and Justice Johnson
Justice Hecht delivered a dissenting opinion, joined
by Justice Medina and Justice Willett
Hallco is entitled to a decision on the merits of its claims that the
County’s ordinance effected a compensable taking of its property.
Because the Court disagrees,
I respectfully dissent.

Recent 2006 Opinions By Justice Nathan Hecht

Meyer v. WMCI-GP, No. 04-0252 (Tex. Dec. 22, 2006)(Justice Hecht)
[bizlaw, arbitration law, compel arbitration, nonparty, right of first refusal, assignment, equitable estoppel]
ALTON J. MEYER, MEYER ACQUISITION CORP., AND FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. WMCO-GP, LLC AND BULLOCK MOTOR
COMPANY; from Angelina County; 9th district (09 03 00255 CV, 126 SW3d 313, 01 15 04)
2 petitions
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice
Medina, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice Willett
(“The trial court should have granted Meyer’s and Ford’s motions to compel arbitration.”)
Justice O'Neill delivered a dissenting opinion

Meyer v. WMCI-GP, No. 04-0252 (Tex. Dec. 22, 2006)(Justice Hecht)
04-0252 ALTON J. MEYER, MEYER ACQUISITION CORP., AND FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. WMCO-GP, LLC AND BULLOCK
MOTOR COMPANY; from Angelina County; 9th district (09 03 00255 CV, 126 SW3d 313, 01 15 04)
2 petitions
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice
Medina, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice Willett
Justice O'Neill delivered a dissenting opinion

Brookshire Grocery v. Taylor No. 03-0408 (Tex. Dec. 1, 2006)(Justice Hecht)
[premises liability, slip-and-fall liability]
03-0408 BROOKSHIRE GROCERY COMPANY, D/B/A BROOKSHIRE FOOD STORES v. MARY FRANCIS TAYLOR; from Lamar
County; 6th district (06‑02‑00122‑CV, 102 SW3d 816, 04‑01‑03)
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument,
the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice
Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice Willett
Justice Johnson delivered a concurring opinion
Justice O'Neill delivered a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Medina

Cases With Dissent or Concurring Opinion by Justice Hecht

Hoover v. Walton No. 04-1004 (Tex. Nov. 3, 2006)(Justice Jefferson)(opinion on rehearing)
[attorneys fees, contingency fee, termination fee, present value of accrued legal fees payable upon attorney substitution,
contrary to public policy, contract unenforceable]
04-1004 HOOVER SLOVACEK L.L.P., FORMERLY HOOVER, BAX & SLOVACEK, L.L.P. v. JOHN B. WALTON, JR.; from Winkler
County; 8th district (08 03 00366 CV, 149 S.W.3d 834, 10 14 04)
2 motions for rehearing

Justice Hecht delivered a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Medina and Justice Willett

The Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co . No. 03-0737 (Tex. Oct 20, 2006)(Justice Hecht)
[anticompetitive business conduct, restraint of trade]
03-0737 THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, ET AL. v. HARMAR BOTTLING COMPANY, ET AL.; from Morris County; 6th district
(06‑01‑00120‑CV, 111 S.W.3d 287, 07‑17‑03)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justice Wainwright, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice
Willett

Five carbonated soft drink bottlers with franchises to distribute Royal Crown Cola in various territories within the Ark-La-Tex
region (a four state region including parts of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas where the three borders meet, and also nearby
southeast Oklahoma) sued The Coca-Cola Company and several distributers of both Coca-Cola and Dr Pepper in the same
area for using calendar marketing agreements (“CMAs”) with retailers to unreasonably restrain trade, monopolize the market,
and attempt and conspire to monopolize the market in violation of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983 (“TFEAA”)
[1] and the antitrust laws of the other three states. The district court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict for the plaintiffs,
awarding damages incurred throughout the region and permanently enjoining, in specified counties in each of the four states,
certain conduct that it determined to be anticompetitive. The court of appeals affirmed.[2]

We address two issues. One is whether Texas courts can adjudicate and remedy an anti-competitive injury occurring in
another state, either under the TFEAA or the law of that state. We hold that the TFEAA will not support extraterritorial relief in the
absence of a showing that such relief promotes competition in Texas or benefits Texas consumers. We also hold that Texas
courts, as a matter of interstate comity, will not decide how another state’s antitrust laws and policies apply to injuries confined
to that state. The other issue is whether the plaintiffs have shown substantial harm, real or threatened, to competition in the
relevant market as a result of the defendants’ conduct. We conclude that there is no evidence of such harm and that the lack of
evidence is fatal to all of the plaintiffs’ claims. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, dismiss the
plaintiffs’ claims of injury occurring in other states, and render judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing on their claims of injury
occurring in Texas.

The Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co (Tex. Oct 20, 2006)(Dissent by Justice Brister)

Justice Brister delivered a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice O'Neill, and Justice Medina

After buying up distributors of the leading soft drink brands in the Ark-La-Tex area, Coke began demanding that retailers stop
advertising competing brands, stop selling some of them, and artificially raise the prices of the rest. Retailers who refused to
play along were punished with higher wholesale prices; only Wal-Mart (a behemoth in its own right) successfully refused.

There is a line between competing and bullying, and the jury found that Coke crossed it. As evidence in the record would allow
reasonable jurors to reach that conclusion, I would not render judgment to the contrary; because the Court does, I respectfully
dissent.

Unlike most other statutes, the antitrust laws are like the common law in that “varying times and circumstances” may give them
“changing content.”[90] Although Texas has had its own antitrust statutes since 1889, the Legislature adopted the current law
in 1983 to give Texas courts broader powers and greater flexibility in addressing new economic and business conditions.[91]
We have addressed the amended law only rarely, and never found a violation of it.[92] It is a shame the Court does so again
today, allowing a monopolist to fix prices, ban consumer ads, and remove competing products.

Because higher prices and fewer choices injured competition in the Ark-La-Tex region, not just Coke’s competitors, I would
remand for the bottlers to establish their damages. Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent. - Scott Brister

Tooke v. City of Mexia No. 03-0878 (Tex. June 30, 2006)(opinion by Justice Hecht)
03-0878 JUDY TOOKE AND EVERETT TOOKE D/B/A TOOKE AND SONS AND D/B/A NATURE'S WAY ORGANIC
LANDSCAPING v. THE CITY OF MEXIA;
from Limestone County; 10th district (10 02 00261 CV, 115 SW3d 618, 07 23 03)
motion for court to take judicial notice granted
The Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment.

Scores of Texas statutes provide, variously, that individuals and entities, public and private, may (“sue and (or) be sued”, “(im)
plead and (or) be impleaded”, “be impleaded”, “prosecute and defend”, “defend or be defended”, “answer and be answered”,
“complain and (or) defend”, or some combination of these phrases, in court.[1] The phrases are also used in municipal
charters and ordinances and in corporate articles and bylaws. Read in context, they sometimes waive governmental immunity
from suit, sometimes do not, and sometimes have nothing whatever to do with immunity, referring instead to the capacity to
sue and be sued or the manner in which suit can be had (for example, by service on specified persons). Because immunity is
waived only by clear and unambiguous language,[2] and because the import of these phrases cannot be ascertained apart
from the context in which they occur, we hold that they do not, in and of themselves, waive immunity from suit.”)

Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice
Medina, and Justice Green
Justice Johnson delivered an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part
Justice O'Neill delivered a dissenting opinion
(Justice Willett not sitting)

General Motors Corp. v. Hudiburg Chevrolet, Inc. No. 03-0987 (Tex. March 17, 2006)(Justice Hecht)
[Product liability, truck, vehicle, duty to indemnify, manufacturer, defect)
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION AND RAWSON-KOENIG, INC. v. HUDIBURG CHEVROLET, INC., AND HUDIBURG
CHEVROLET HOLDING, INC.; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-02-01166-CV, 114 S.W.3d 680, 08-05-03) Two petitions The
Court reverses in part, modifies, and affirms as modified the court of appeals' judgment, and remands the case to the trial
court. Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court